diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand	2022-08-04 12:17:52.148556301 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c	2022-08-04 12:19:41.783533552 +0200
@@ -20,7 +20,14 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused
     size_t entropy_available;
     RAND_POOL *pool;
 
-    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
+    /*
+     * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
+     * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
+     * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
+     * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
+     * amount of entropy.
+     */
+    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
     if (pool == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
         return 0;
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand	2022-08-04 11:56:10.100950299 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c	2022-08-04 11:59:11.241564925 +0200
@@ -139,7 +139,11 @@ size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG
      * to the nearest byte.  If the entropy is of less than full quality,
      * the amount required should be scaled up appropriately here.
      */
-    bytes_needed = (entropy + 7) / 8;
+    /*
+     * FIPS 140-3: the yet draft SP800-90C requires requested entropy
+     * + 128 bits during initial seeding
+     */
+    bytes_needed = (entropy + 128 + 7) / 8;
     if (bytes_needed < min_len)
         bytes_needed = min_len;
     if (bytes_needed > max_len)
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand	2022-08-03 12:14:39.409370134 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c	2022-08-03 12:19:06.320700346 +0200
@@ -575,6 +575,9 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drb
 #endif
     }
 
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+    prediction_resistance = 1;
+#endif
     /* Reseed using our sources in addition */
     entropylen = get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
                              drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen,
@@ -669,8 +669,14 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_generate(PROV_DRBG *d
             reseed_required = 1;
     }
     if (drbg->parent != NULL
-            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter)
+            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter) {
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+        /* Red Hat patches provide chain reseeding when necessary so just sync counters*/
+        drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
+#else
         reseed_required = 1;
+#endif
+        }
 
     if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
         if (!ossl_prov_drbg_reseed_unlocked(drbg, prediction_resistance, NULL,
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg	2023-03-13 12:17:47.705538612 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h	2023-03-13 12:18:03.060702092 +0100
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
  *
  * The value is in bytes.
  */
-#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ    16
+#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ   32
 
 /*
  * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand	2022-08-03 11:09:01.301637515 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c	2022-08-03 11:13:00.058688605 +0200
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
 # include <fcntl.h>
 # include <unistd.h>
 # include <sys/time.h>
+# include <sys/random.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
 
 static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
 
@@ -339,70 +341,8 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
      * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
      * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
      */
-
-    /*
-     * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
-     *
-     * Known OSs that should support this:
-     * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
-     * - Solaris since 11.3
-     * - OpenBSD since 5.6
-     * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
-     * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
-     *
-     * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented
-     * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS
-     */
-#  if !defined(__DragonFly__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
-#    if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
-    extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
-
-    if (getentropy != NULL) {
-        if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0)
-            return (ssize_t)buflen;
-        if (errno != ENOSYS)
-            return -1;
-    }
-#    elif defined(OPENSSL_APPLE_CRYPTO_RANDOM)
-
-    if (CCRandomGenerateBytes(buf, buflen) == kCCSuccess)
-	    return (ssize_t)buflen;
-
-    return -1;
-#    else
-    union {
-        void *p;
-        int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
-    } p_getentropy;
-
-    /*
-     * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
-     * call this function often.
-     */
-    ERR_set_mark();
-    p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
-    ERR_pop_to_mark();
-    if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
-        return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
-#    endif
-#  endif /* !__DragonFly__ */
-
-    /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
-#  if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
-    return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
-#  elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
-    return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
-#  elif (defined(__DragonFly__)  && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) \
-     || (defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version >= 1000000000)
-    return getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
-#  elif defined(__wasi__)
-    if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0)
-      return (ssize_t)buflen;
-    return -1;
-#  else
-    errno = ENOSYS;
-    return -1;
-#  endif
+    int realbuflen = buflen > 32 ? 32 : buflen; /* Red Hat uses downstream patch to always seed from getrandom() */
+    return EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL) ? getrandom(buf, realbuflen, GRND_RANDOM) : getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
 }
 #  endif    /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
 
diff -up openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c.xxx openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
--- openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c.xxx	2024-04-10 13:14:38.984033920 +0200
+++ openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c	2024-04-10 13:15:20.565045748 +0200
@@ -102,7 +102,14 @@ static int seed_src_generate(void *vseed
         return 0;
     }
 
-    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength, 1, outlen, outlen);
+    /*
+     * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
+     * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
+     * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
+     * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
+     * amount of entropy.
+     */
+    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength + 64, 1, outlen, outlen);
     if (pool == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
         return 0;
@@ -189,7 +189,14 @@ static size_t seed_get_seed(void *vseed,
     size_t i;
     RAND_POOL *pool;
 
-    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
+    /*
+     * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
+     * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
+     * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
+     * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
+     * amount of entropy.
+     */
+    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
     if (pool == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
         return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 14999540ab..b05b84717b 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
 
 #include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
@@ -723,15 +723,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_primary(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
         return ret;
     }
 
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
-    if (dgbl->seed == NULL) {
-        ERR_set_mark();
-        dgbl->seed = rand_new_seed(ctx);
-        ERR_pop_to_mark();
-    }
-#endif
-
-    ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, dgbl->seed,
+    ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL,
                                         PRIMARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
                                         PRIMARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 1);
     /*
@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_public(OSSL_LIB_
         if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private) == NULL
                 && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, rand_delete_thread_state))
             return NULL;
-        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, primary, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
+        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
                              SECONDARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 0);
         CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public, rand);
     }
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_private(OSSL_LIB
         if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public) == NULL
                 && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, rand_delete_thread_state))
             return NULL;
-        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, primary, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
+        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
                              SECONDARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 0);
         CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private, rand);
     }
diff -up openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c.xxx openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c
--- openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c.xxx	2024-05-02 15:37:23.550979597 +0200
+++ openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c	2024-05-02 15:45:37.189979881 +0200
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int test_drbg_reseed(int expect_s
         reseed_when = time(NULL);
 
     /* Generate random output from the public and private DRBG */
-    before_reseed = expect_primary_reseed == 1 ? reseed_when : 0;
+    before_reseed = 0;
     if (!TEST_int_eq(rand_bytes((unsigned char*)public_random,
                                 RANDOM_SIZE), expect_success)
         || !TEST_int_eq(rand_priv_bytes((unsigned char*) private_random,
@@ -232,8 +232,8 @@ static int test_drbg_reseed(int expect_s
      */
 
     /* Test whether reseeding succeeded as expected */
-    if (!TEST_int_eq(state(primary), expected_state)
-        || !TEST_int_eq(state(public), expected_state)
+    if (/*!TEST_int_eq(state(primary), expected_state)
+        ||*/ !TEST_int_eq(state(public), expected_state)
         || !TEST_int_eq(state(private), expected_state))
         return 0;
 
@@ -246,16 +246,16 @@ static int test_drbg_reseed(int expect_s
     if (expect_public_reseed >= 0) {
         /* Test whether public DRBG was reseeded as expected */
         if (!TEST_int_ge(reseed_counter(public), public_reseed)
-                || !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(public),
-                                 reseed_counter(primary)))
+                /*|| !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(public),
+                                 reseed_counter(primary))*/)
             return 0;
     }
 
     if (expect_private_reseed >= 0) {
         /* Test whether public DRBG was reseeded as expected */
         if (!TEST_int_ge(reseed_counter(private), private_reseed)
-                || !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(private),
-                                 reseed_counter(primary)))
+                /*|| !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(private),
+                                 reseed_counter(primary))*/)
             return 0;
     }
 
@@ -577,8 +577,8 @@ static int test_rand_reseed(void)
     if (!TEST_ptr_ne(public, private)
         || !TEST_ptr_ne(public, primary)
         || !TEST_ptr_ne(private, primary)
-        || !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(public)->parent, prov_rand(primary))
-        || !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(private)->parent, prov_rand(primary)))
+        /*|| !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(public)->parent, prov_rand(primary))
+        || !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(private)->parent, prov_rand(primary))*/)
         return 0;
 
     /* Disable CRNG testing for the primary DRBG */
